Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 14

Issue 4

Article 3

September 1936

Notes and Comments
J. M. Coughlan
John M. Hadsall
J. L. Porter

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
J. M. Coughlan, John M. Hadsall & J. L. Porter, Notes and Comments, 14 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 351 (1936).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol14/iss4/3

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES TO PROVE INTENT ON
TRIAL FOR LARCENY

In the case of State v. Voss,' the conviction of the defendant
for the larceny of several hogs was sustained by the Supreme
Court of Minnesota. At the trial it appeared that the defendant
had confessed that, on the evening in question, he and two
accomplices had penned up the hogs in question; that subsequently, that same evening the three had gone to a nearby granary and stolen some barley; that the following morning the
hogs were sold. One of the accomplices testified to the foregoing
facts and on appeal one of the assignments of error was the
admission by the court of the evidence relating to the theft of
the barley. The reviewing court held that "the stealing of the
barley was so closely related to the stealing of the hogs as to
permit introduction of evidence thereof for the purpose of showing criminal intent, and to show that defendant was a participant in all that was done that evening, night, and the next
morning." Such a divergence of views exists on the admissibility
of evidence of other crimes that it might well be that in another
state the admission of evidence of the theft of the barley would
be held to be prejudicial error.
The general principle, to which the courts of England and the
United States have generally subscribed,2 is that evidence of
other crimes is not admissible. The fundamental soundness of
the principle and its general application is aptly described in
this excerpt from an opinion of the New York court: "This rule,
so universally recognized and so firmly established in all Englishspeaking lands, is rooted in that jealous regard for the liberty
of the individual which has distinguished our jurisprudence from
all others, at least from the birth of Magna Charta. "3
The practical reasons for the existence of the principle were
summarized, in an opinion rendered by the Supreme Court of
Washington, as follows: "The defendant comes to the trial pre1 192 Minn. 127, 255 N. W. 843 (1934).
2 Boyd v. U. S., 142 U. S. 450, 12 S. Ct. 292, 35 t: Ed. 1077 (1892);
Miller v. State, 120 Ark. 492, 179 S.W. 1001 (1915) ; Youree v. Territory.
3 Ariz. 346, 29 P. 894 (1892) ; People v. King, 276 Ill.
138, 114 N. E. 601
(1916) ; People v. Grutz, 212 N. Y. 72, 105 N. E. 843 (1914) ; Rex v. Bond.
[1906] 2 K. B. 389. And see 39 Law Q. Rev. 212; 33 Law Q. Rev. 28;
49 Law Q. Rev. 473; 50 Law Q. Rev. 386; 35 Harv. L. Rev. 434-7; 20 II1.
L. Rev. 182.
3 People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286, 62 L. R. A. 193
(1901).

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

pared to meet only the crime with which he is accused, and he
cannot from the nature of things be prepared to defend against
other crimes that may be charged against him. Moreover, it is
not the policy of the law to convict a man of one crime by showing that he has at some time been guilty of another. As testimony
of the kind mentioned established the bad character of the
defendant, its inevitable effect is to prejudice the minds of the
jury against him, causing them to find him guilty of the crime
charged on doubtful evidence, or evidence that would not otherwise produce a conviction. It violates, also, another well settled
rule of criminal jurisprudence, namely, it permits the state to
attack the character of the defendant when he does not himself
put his character in issue. 4
In the face of the basic soundness of the principle and the
ponderous practical reasons for its existence the courts have been
loath to admit exceptions to its application. The earliest cases
in which the English courts admitted evidence of other crimes
were those of forgeries. In 1851, the English court, in the case of
an indictment charging larceny and receiving stolen goods, held
that the evidence that the defendant had in his possession goods
which had been stolen three months previous to the crimes charged
was inadmissible, saying, "The cases of uttering [forgeries]
with a guilty knowledge, certainly go very far, and I should be
very unwilling to apply their principle generally to the criminal
law. '"5 Although in time the English courts came to recognize
certain exceptins to ti general principle, the original rcluctance and caution in doing so remained. 6 As the courts
originally made an exception to prove the mental state-knowledge in case of forgeries-it is not strange that a similar exception was made where the intent, with which the alleged criminal
act was done, was in issue. 7 When exceptions were made, the
4 State v. Eder, 36 Wash. 482, 78 P. 1023 (1904).

5 Reg. v. Oddy, 2 Den. 264, 169 Eng. Rep. 499 (1851). Previous to this,
evidence of other crimes had been admitted to rebut a defense of accident
in at least two other types of cases: Reg. v. Geering, 18 L. J. (M. C.) 215
(1849), a case of murder; Rex v. Voke, Russ and Ry. 531, 168 Eng. Rep.
934 (1823), a case of assault with intent to kill.
6 "Therefore, if, as is plain, we have to recognize the existence of certain
circumstances in which justice cannot be attained at the trial without a disclosure of prior offenses, the utmost vigilance at least should be maintained
in restricting the number of such cases, and in seeing that the general rule
S.. which . . . excludes evidence of prior offenses, is not broken or frittered
away by the creation of novel and anomalous exceptions." Rex v. Bond,
[1906] 2 K. B. 389.
7 Reg. v. Geering, 18 L. J. (M. C.) 215 (1849); Rex v. Voke, Russ. and
Ry. 531, 168 Eng. Rep. 934 (1823).
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courts hedged them in with various restrictions; these restrictions often varied in the various state courts of the United States.
On some of the propositions involved there is agreement, on
others it will be readily seen that the courts are in hopeless conflict as will be evidenced by the conclusions reached.8
A frequently occurring type of case in which evidence of other
crimes is admitted to prove a larcenous intent, that is, the intent
to deprive the owner of his property, is that in which the defendant expressly relies on the defense of no knowledge, or of a taking in good faith under an honest belief that a right to the goods
existed in the defendant. In a case where the defendant was
charged with the larceny of horses, evidence was introduced by
the defendant to show that he had paid for the horses, and it was
held proper to admit evidence that the defendant had paid certain persons money to bring to him unbranded horses which they
could pick up, the latter larcenies not being included in the
indictment.9 Where a defendant was charged with stealing a
certain hog, it was held proper on the question of intent, where
the defendant claimed he only intended to impound the hog, to
prove that the defendant had penned up at a previous time ten
other hogs. 10 In a prosecution for larceny of wheat, the defendant, who owned the truck used to carry away the wheat, claimed
he had no knowledge that his two co-defendants were stealing
the wheat. To prove knowledge, evidence that the defendant
had accompanied the co-defendants on another trip and split the
proceeds of a sale of the wheat stolen at that time was held properly admitted."
A modification of this doctrine is found in a Vermont decision.
The indictment charged the defendant with stealing two laprobes. Evidence was admitted by the trial court to prove that
the defendant and an accomplice went out to steal some phosphate, that they entered fourteen places and found no phosphate
but stole articles from each place. When the lap-robes were
stolen the defendant claimed he waited outside while his accomplice went to get the robes. The defendant and his accomplice
8 ".. . the general doctrine has been varied, or there has been a departure

therefrom to a greater or lesser degree, in cases of a particular or peculiar
nature in some, if not all, jurisdictions. In some courts and in some cases
the departure has been quite marked in extent and degree, while in others
there has been exhibited a decided hesitancy to indulge in a modification of
the general rule." Davis v. State, 54 Neb. 177, 74 N. W. 599 (1898).
9 Tinsley v. U. S., 43 F. (2d) 890 (1930).
10 Garcia v. State, 108 Tex. Cr. R. 245, 299 S. W. 909 (1927).
11 State v. Chitwood, 34 N. M. 505, 285 P. 499 (1930).
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then went to the defendant's home and had lunch, after which
they again went out to steal the phosphate which they had not
yet succeeded in finding, and on this trip another larceny occurred. The court held that the evidence of the first fourteen
larcenies was admissible to show knowledge on the part of the
defendant that the lap-robes were being stolen, but the court
held it error to admit evidence of the subsequent larceny, since
that one was "independent and separate.' '12
The last mentioned decision might be compared with those of
the Arkansas court which holds that, where the defendant was
charged with the larceny of a horse and where the defense was
that at the time the horses were taken there was no intent to
steal them, it was improper to admit evidence that at another
time the defendant had stolen a bridle from another person and
used it on the horse alleged to have been stolen, on the ground
that the theft of the bridle was a separate and distinct offense. 13
It has been held that the admissibility of evidence of other
crimes to prove intent is not dependent on the introduction by
the defendant of evidence tending to show a lack of criminal
intent; it is admissible to meet the "possible contention" of
defendant that there was no criminal intent. 14 In an early case
in Indiana, involving an indictment for larceny, it was stated
by the court that "wherever the intent with which an alleged
offense was committed is equivocal, and such intent becomes an
issue at the trial, proof of other similar offenses is admissible...
but where, from the nature of the offense under investigation,
proof of its commission as charged ...carries with it the evident
implication of a criminal intent, evidence . ..of other offenses
ought not to be admitted."' 5 In a recent case decided by the
same court the latter qualification was expressly abrogated, and
the court held that evidence of other offenses was competent to
prove intent whether or not intent might be inferred prima facie
12

State v. Kelley, 65 Vt. 531, 27 A. 203 (1893).

13 Dove v. State, 37 Ark. 261

(1881); Endaily v. State, 39 Ark. 278
(1882). In Yelvington v. State, 169 Ark. 359, 275 S. W. 701 (1925), under
an indictment charging the theft of two mules, evidence that the defendant
had in his possession harness stolen at a different time and place was held
inadmissible, though it was said that proof of other crimes of a similar
nature, shown to have been committed about the same time may be admitted
as disclosing criminal intent. See also People v. Nagle, 137 Mich. 88, 100
359, 183 N. E. 217 (1932).
N. W. 273 (1904) ; People v. Gawlick, 350 Ill.
14 State v. Miller, 154 La. 138, 97 So. 342 (1923) ; State v. Hughes, 76
Mont. 421, 246 P. 959 (1926).
15 Shears v. State, 147 Ind. 51, 46 N. E. 331 (1897).
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from proof of the commission of the crime of which the defendant
stood charged. 16
As indicative of the divergent attitude of the courts in regard
to admitting evidence to prove intent, the following decisions
are significant. In an indictment against the defendant for grand
larceny, it was charged that the defendant conducted an employment agency and procured a position for one C. The defendant
requested C to put up a one-hundred-dollar deposit as security
for C's good conduct. After three months, the defendant told C
that his employer no longer needed his (C's) services and the
defendant attempted to induce C to give up a note which the
employer had given him for the hundred dollars. In this case
evidence of a similar transaction in which the defendant was a
party was held admissible. 1 7 In another case, on the trial of
the defendant on a charge of conspiracy to steal, the evidence
showed that the defendant agreed with the complaining witness
to purchase a business, each party to pay a certain amount of
cash. While the two were in a room counting their money, two
men broke in, claimed to be detectives, and seized the money
claiming it was counterfeit. The trial court admitted evidence
of a similar scheme in which the defendant was involved on
the ground that it was admissible under one of these exceptions
to the general rule: first, from the necessity of the case; second,
when the intent is to be proved from circumstances; third, where
the identity of the accused is expressly in issue. The reviewing
court held the evidence was inadmissible, saying, "Decisions on
the general rule are more frequent than upon the exceptions, and
it will be observed . . .that the exceptions are permitted from

absolute necessity to aid in the detection and punishment of
crime and they should be carefully limited, and guarded by the
courts."18 In another case, involving the charge of larceny of
three hundred dollars which the complaining witness gave to the
defendant to purchase potatoes, pursuant to an agreement of
the parties to enter into the produce business, the defendant
failed to buy the potatoes, and the court held that evidence of
similar transactions by the defendant was admissible on the
question of intent.19 In a fourth case, an indictment charged
larceny by bailee, and the evidence relevant to the charge showed
16 ". .. we do not recognize any qualifications of this rule [admissibility]
in case of offenses where intent may be inferred from the act itself." Huffman v. State, 205 Ind. 75, 185 N. E. 131 (1933).
17 People v. Fehrenbach, 102 Cal. 394, 36 P. 678 (1894).
18 Effler v. State, 27 Del. 62, 85 A. 731 (1913).
19 People v. Hughes, 36 N. Y. S. 493 (1895).
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that the defendant told a livery stable owner that he was a
circus advance agent and wished to hire a rig which he would
return in an hour. Instead, the defendant took the rig and left
the state. The court held that it was error to admit evidence
that on the same day the defendant had told the same story to
a bakery clerk and had obtained a five dollar "loan." The court
said, "There were no forcible reasons . . . for a departure or
exception from the general rule. "20
21
Although some courts will admit evidence of subsequent acts,
committed within a reasonable time, there is reputable authority
holding that such evidence is not admissible. 22 At least two of
the jurisdictions which hold generally that evidence of subsequent similar acts is admissible have held that in case of receiving stolen goods evidence of subsequent receivings is not admissible to prove knowledge. 23 In respect to this phase of the
problem, Illinois draws a distinction which appears to be unique.
In two cases where the only evidence of similar offences offered
related to subsequent offenses, the court held that they were
inadmissible to prove intent. 24 In a subsequent case involving a
charge of criminal abortion, it was held that unless there was
also evidence of prior similar acts, the evidence relating to the
subsequent acts was inadmissible. The reasoning of the court
seems sound: "It is contrary to the theory of our criminal law
to presume that a defendant has been a criminal from his birth
or from any former period of time or that he has a guilty intent,
in the absence of proof that he has formerly committed a criminal act. His first offense must be held to be the beginning of
his criminal career, and in every such case every element of the
crime must be proved and not presumed from subsequent acts
alone.'' 25 The same principle was given by the court as controlling in a subsequent case involving a charge of forging a
20
21

Davis v. State, 54 Neb. 177, 74 N. W. 599 (1898).
State v. Siddoway, 61 Utah 189, 211 P. 968 (1922) ; Baldwin v. State,

46 Fla. 115, 35 So. 220 (1903); Suarez v. State, 95 Fla. 42, 115 So. 519
(1928); Cooper v. State, 193 Ind. 144, 139 N. E. 184 (1923) ; People v.
Hughes, 36 N. Y. S. 493 (1895) ; People v. Fehrenbach, 102 Cal. 394, 36 P.
678 (1894).
22 Coblentz v. State, 84 Ohio St. 235, 95 N. E. 768 (1911) ; State v.
Moxley, 41 Mont. 402, 110 P. 83 (1910); Poon v. State, 120 Tex. Cr. R.
522, 48 S. W. (2d) 307 (1932).
23 People v. Willard, 92 Cal. 482, 28 P. 585 (1891); Dampier v. State,
191 Ind. 334, 132 N. E. 590 (1921).
24 People v. Baskin, 254 I1. 509, 98 N. E. 957 (1912) ; People v. Lindley,
282 I1. 377, 118 N. E. 719 (1918).
25 People v. Hobbs, 297 Ill. 399,130 N. E. 779 (1921).
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cheek;26 so it appears that subsequent similar acts are not
admissible in evidence in Illinois unless accompanied by evidence
of prior similar acts.
A prerequisite to the admission of evidence of other similar
acts to prove intent is the presentation of some proof that
27
the defendant committed the act charged in the indictment.
And such prerequisite is even more necessary where it is not
shown that the accused, charged with embezzlement, even
had
28
knowledge, or reason to know, that funds were missing.
A factor which has sometimes been the grounds for a reversal
of a conviction is the length of time between the principal crime
charged and that admitted in evidence to prove intent. Although
the general propositions as stated by the courts are to the effect
that the length of time over which evidence of other crimes may
be given to prove intent is largely within the sound legal discretion of the trial court, 29 there may be such an abuse of that
discretion as amounts to reversible error.30 In Texas, in cases
involving the receiving of stolen goods, evidence of a receiving
of other stolen goods, which occurred two weeks after the receiving charged, was held inadmissible, the court saying that the
latter act was not "sufficiently contemporaneous. "31 In a case
involving the passing of forged checks, the Indiana court held
that it was proper to admit evidence of another transaction which
occurred five days later but reversed the conviction on the
ground that evidence of another unrelated similar transaction
which occurred four and a half years before was improperly
admitted. 32 In this case the court stated the principle that to be
admissible in evidence, the act must have occurred within such
a period of time before or after the commission of the particular
offense as to afford some basis for an inference that the same
intent which accompanied one of the alleged acts was present
People
Suarez
Cr. 357, 276
28 People
26
27

v. Moshiek, 323 Ill. 11, 153 N. E. 720 (1926).
v. State, 95 Fla. 42, 115 So. 519 (1928) ; Cude v. State, 42 Okla.
P. 240 (1929).
v. Toohill, 203 N. Y. S. 457 (1924) ; Prettyman v. U. S., 180 F.

30 (1910).
29 "No exact limitation of time can be fixed as to when another offense
tending to prove the intent of the act charged is remote. The decision of
that question must depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. .. "
State v. Siddoway, 61 Utah 189, 211 P. 968 (1922) ; State v. Hall, 45 Mont.
498, 125 P. 639 (1912).
30 Cooper v. State, 193 Ind. 144, 139 N. E. 184 (1923).
31 Bismarck v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. R. 54, 73 S. W. 965 (1903). See also
Poon v. State, 120 Tex. Cr. R. 522, 48 S. W. (2d) 307 (1932).
32 Cooper v. State, 193 Ind. 144, 139 N. E. 184 (1923).
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when the other was committed. Where some connection between
the acts is shown other than the mere element of time, the period
of time may be longer than where the acts are disconnected. This
is aptly illustrated by a case in which the defendant was charged
with a malicious wounding of his cousin. The defendant claimed
that the shooting was accidental. Evidence that, eleven years
before, the defendant had intentionally shot and wounded his
brother-in-law, was held properly admitted after evidence had
been given that the latter was present at the time of the shooting
of the cousin, that, immediately prior to the shooting, the defendant had quarreled with his brother-in-law and stated that he would
"get him this time sure," and that the accused had been quoted
as saying that he "got the wrong man. "33
Where evidence of other similar crimes is admitted in evidence, most courts agree that ordinarily the court should restrict
the jury in their consideration of such evidence to the sole purpose for which it was admitted. 34 This rule applies where there
is any danger that the jury might convict on the ground that
the defendant was guilty of another crime. Where there is no
such danger, it is not necessary to instruct the jury as to the
restricted purpose. 35 It has ben held in Illinois and California
that where the defendant does not ask for an instruction relative
to the restricted purpose of the evidence, even though such an
instruction, if requested, would have been proper, the failure
of the court to give such an instruction is not error.3 6 However,
in TPxq it has been held that it wao the duty of the court to
limit the consideration of the evidence to its proper purpose,
wiiout any request or exception by th-e ULIUndant.-"
Because the effect which evidence of other crimes has on the
defendant's case is almost always damaging, improperly admitted evidence of such other crimes is an impelling reason, on
review of the case, for a reversal. When this error is committed,
the reviewing court should not dismiss it as unprejudicial without full consideration. Evidence of other crimes committed by
the defendant is very likely to influence the jury in their view
3 Colvin v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 663, 137 S. E. 476 (1927).
34 Hanley v. State, 28 Tex. App. 375, 13 S. W. 142 (1890) ; State v.

Reynolds, 5 Kan. App. 515, 47 P. 573 (1896).
35 Moseley v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 578, 38 S. W. 197 (1896) ; Carroll v.
State, 58 S. W. 340 (Tex. Cr. App., 1900).
36 Glover v. People, 204 Ill. 170, 68 N. E. 464 (1903) ; People v. Fultz,
109 Cal. 258, 41 P. 1040 (1895).
37 Martin v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 125, 35 S. W. 976 (1896).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

of the balance of the evidence in the case and thereby place the
defendant under an unfair handicap. 38 In one case, the Federal
court said that although there probably was competent evidence
warranting conviction, it would be going far to say that the
defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of such incompetent evidence; also that the defendant was entitled to a fair
trial which he could not have after incompetent evidence of the
commission of another crime was admitted. 39 This proposition
was somewhat modified in a later case decided by a Federal
court which held that, where there was overwhelming evidence
of the guilt of the defendant, the admission by the trial court of
incompetent evidence of other crimes did not constitute reversible error. 40 But, at least in some states, a conviction will be
reversed despite the existence of competent evidence of guilt
41
if evidence of other crimes is improperly admitted.
In the light of the conflict in the decisions of the courts on some
of the questions considered, it is impossible to formulate any
general proposition which would cover the law on the subject
in every state. The most that can be done in the way of generalization is to recognize that to the general proposition of the
inadmissibility of evidence of other crimes there are exceptions,
one of which is that such evidence is admissible where from its
nature it is relevant to the question of intent. Beyond this, only
by reference to the decisions in the particular state can it be
definitely decided whether a particular crime is relevant and
admissible in evidence to prove intent. This reference should
include the consideration of factors which are held to be material, as shown by the decisions above noted. The more important
of these factors are: (1) The relative order in which the collateral
crime and the particular charged crime occurred, that is, whether
the collateral crime preceded or followed the particular crime;
(2) The remoteness in time of the collateral crime; (3) The connection between the collateral crime and the particular crime
charged, or in other words whether the collateral crime was connected or "separate and independent"; (4) The similarity between the two crimes.
J. Al. COUGHLAN
People v. Buffom, 214 N. Y. 53, 108 N. E. 184 (1915).
Hatchet v. U. S., 54 App. D. C. 43, 293 F. 1010 (1923).
40 Heglin v. U. S., 27 F. (2d) 310 (1928).
41 State v. Kelley, 65 Vt. 531, 27 A. 203 (1893) ; Cooper v. State, 193
Ind. 144, 139 N. E. 184 (1923).
38

39
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VALIDITY OF SPLIT MORTGAGE SECURITIES FOR THE INVESTMENTS
OF GUARDLNS AND CONSERVATORS WITH OR WITHOUT

PRIOR JUDICIAL APPROVAL

In February, 1936, the Supreme Court of Illinois delivered a
decision 1 which finally rules on the legality of "split" mortgage
securities as investments for guardians and conservators. The
respective statutes 2 were construed to authorize investments in
existing notes or bonds, which were part of issues being secured
by a first mortgage or trust deed, where they were prior to or
on a parity with all other portions of the debt secured by the
same instrument.
The decision involved three cases which were treated as consolidated, because each case related to the right of a conservator
or guardian to invest the funds of his ward in "split" mortgage
securities. The proceedings evolved from the objection by the
guardians ad litem of the various wards to the approval of the
final accounts because of the inclusion of bonds or notes which
were part of an issue of similar notes or bonds secured by a
single mortgage. None of the trust deeds in the nature of a mortgage securing the notes purchased contained a parity clause
although each provided for acceleration of the whole debt in
case of any default. Some of the notes were purchased without
prior authority, and the guardian in one case afterwards procured an order purporting to authorize one of the purchases.
The purchases of the other notes were submitted in subsequent
current accounts and were approved.
The question argued was whether or not a "split" mortgage
investment was a proper loan upon the security of real estate
as provided by the statutes. There was no argument advanced
as to the extent of the protection secured by obtaining a court
order authorizing the investment. Before contemplating, however, whether such an order should be an absolute safeguard to
the conservator or guardian, we should first consider the question of investment decided by this case.
When the investment provisions of the respective acts relating
to guardians and conservators 3 are compared it is observed that
both require the ward's money to be kept at interest upon
security to be approved by the court and both provide for investment on approval of the court in certain bonds and for loans not
I In re Lalla's Estate, 362 Ill. 621, 1 N. E. (2d) 50 (1936).
2 Guardians, Smith-Hurd II1. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 64, sec. 22; Conservators, (Lunatics et al.), Ibid., Ch. 86, sec. 18.
3 Ibid.
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exceeding $100 on personal security. The Guardian and Ward
Act requires that loans upon real estate be secured by first
mortgage, whereas a conservator may loan upon real estate
secured by first mortgage or trust deed thereon. Section 25, however, of the Guardian and Ward Act does provide that "the
word mortgage as used in this act shall include a trust deed in
the nature of a mortgage." Although this section concerns the
mortgaging of the ward's property and not the investment
thereof, probably the legislative intent was to treat a mortgage
and a trust deed mortgage as identical. In the instant case this
point was not discussed as the parties stipulated that there was
no substantial difference between the two acts. From the decision it is apparent that the court agreed with them; indeed,
another holding would appear to be only a quibble on words. A
respected authority on Illinois real property law4 states that the
ordinary mortgage and the trust deed are forms of borrowing on
the security of real estate and are identical so far as security is
concerned; the difference is only a matter of convenience to the
lender.
The court decided that a first mortgage was a lien which had
priority over all other mortgages and the fact that the debt was
divided among many persons did not affect the quality of the
lien. If, however, the priority of the notes is different, the
notes are regarded as so many successive mortgages, each having
priority according to maturity 5 and the acceleration clause in
case of default would not affect such priority.6 Therefore, the
investments in two of the estates were approved, because all the
notes in the issue were payable without priority. Only one note
in the other estate was approved as such note matured before any
other note of its series. The other notes were denied approval as
they were subject to the priority of notes maturing earlier.
7
This decision seems more sound than the recent appellate case
wherein the court decided that the investment by a conservator
in notes secured by a first mortgage securing other notes on a
parity does not conform with the statute, since there are other
notes of an equal lien. The court supported its finding by a reference to People v. Mitchell,8. an Appellate Court decision ren4 Nathan William MacChesney, Principles of Real Estate Law (Macmillan Co., 1927), p. 283.

Schultz v. Plankinton Bank, 141 Ill. 116, 30 N. E. 346 (1892).
Koester v. Burke, 81 Ill. 436 (1876) ; Horn v. Bennett, 135 Ind. 158,
34 N. E. 321 (1893).
7 In re Estate of Sargent, 276 Ill.
App. 312 (1934).
5
6

App. 8 (1921).
8 223 Ill.
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dered in 1921, which case, however, is of doubtful substantiation
as it involved notes due serially.
It is clear that the statutes propose to specify the kind and
quality of the mortgage, and a note which by reason of its
earlier maturity has priority over all other notes secured by a
first mortgage is a prior lien as effectually as if it were the only
note secured. If the note is on a parity with the others, it remains a first mortgage security, and there is no lien which has
a prior right to be satisfied from the property. The rule then is
that a guardian or a conservator may invest the funds of the
ward in "split" mortgage securities if the note purchased is on
a parity with the notes of the earliest maturity.
In the decision, the court said, referring to the investments
allowed, that they also complied with the statutes in that they
were approved by the probate court prior to their purchase or in
subsequent current accounts before default. This statement is
important in a determination of Illinois law relating to the
ambiguity in the Guardian and Ward Act relating to investments.9 That act does not contain the provision of the act governing conservators' investments that "all loans shall be subject
to the approval of the court," but in McIntyre v. People10 the
court held that by necessary implication the original loan must
be made with the court's approval. In would appear now, that
such approval is necessary on the guardian's behalf but it need
not be obtained in advance of the purchase of the investment.
In view of the fact that the illegal investments which had been
subsequently approved were disallowed, however, how is the
guardian or conservator protected by obtaining court approval ?
Probably this approval is conclusive only to prove that the
guardian used proper business judgment in selecting one of
many "legal" investments. No Illinois case has been found involving the protection afforded a guardian by the court's approval of an illegal investment although the Supreme Court has
held that the approval of a current report containing a previously unauthorized investment would be presumed correct in the
absence of a contrary showing."
It seems that the guardian assumes the risk of the court's reversing an approval of an investment. Certainly the subsequent
approval of an illegal investment should not afford more protec9 See 14 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 111, "Defects in the Illinois Probate
Statutes," Geo. S. Stansell.
10 103 Ill. 142 (1882).
11 In re Guardianship of Lutz, 362 Ill. 631, 1 N. E. (2d) 55 (1936).
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tion than the subsequent approval of a legal investment. Illinois
decisions in point are conflicting, but some have held that the
direction in the Guardian and Ward Act "to keep his ward's
money at interest on security to be approved by the court" is
mandatory and an investment made without approval is made
at the guardian's peril, and the subsequent approval of such
investment would be unimportant, as the court has no power
to render an illegal act valid.' 2 Other jurisdictions are in accord
in holding that the court's approval of a guardian's annual
report, which disclosed investments made without a previous
court order, does not amount to a ratification of his acts in making
such investments, so as to protect him from liability with reference thereto.' 3
However, in the case of Bruner v. Wolford's Estate,14 which
should be considered as the authoritative Illinois view, since it
was decided in 1934, the act relating to conservators was held not
to require approval in advance of an investment, although the
conservator would be personally liable if the loan were not approved. If his current reports, listing the investment, are approved, the conservator is not chargeable with having caused a
loss through mismanagement of the estate. There are some southern cases 15 which go even further and hold that if any investment
is sanctioned by the court, the guardian is not liable for loss occurring thereon unless caused by his subsequent default.
From the foregoing survey it appears that the Illinois view is
that neither the guardian nor the conservator is protected by a
court order against an objection by the ward to an illegal investment. As to a legal investment, the guardian or conservator assumes the position of guarantor if such investment is made without a prior court order; if the loan is later approved in a current
report of the guardian or conservator, the latter are released
from any liability because of a loss incurred after such approval.
J. L. PORTER
12 Winslow v. People, 117 I1. 152, 7 N. E. 135 (1886); Chapman v.
American Surety Co., 261 Ill. 594, 104 N. E. 247 (1914); Kattelman v.
Estate of Guthrie, 142 l1. 357, 31 N. E. 589 (1892).
'3 In re O'Brien's Estate, 80 Neb. 125, 113 N. W. 1001 (1907) ; Mumford
v. Rood, 36 S. D. 80, 153 N. W. 921 (1915).
14 356 Ill. 514, 191 N. E. 70 (1934).

15 Bryant v. Craig, 12 Ala. 354 (1847) ; Newman v. Reed, 50 Ala. 297
(1874) ; O'Hara v. Shepherd, 3 Md. Ch. 306 (1851) ; Carlysle v. Carlysle, 10
Md. 440 (1857).

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CIVIL PRACTICE ACT AS TO APPEALS FROM
INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS CONCERNING INJUNCTIONS AND RECEIVERS

The Supreme Court of Illinois has concluded in Hallberg v.
Goldblatt Bros., Inc.' that section 78 of the Civil Practice Act is
constitutional and affords to appellees, on appeal from interlocutory orders dealing with injunctions or receivers, due process of
law.2 The Superior Court of Cook County, in this case, had
granted a temporary injunction forbidding distribution of advertising matter on Chicago's streets unless the papers were
securely fastened. The defendants gave notice of appeal, filed
the record, abstract, briefs, and appeal bond with the clerk of
the Appellate Court, filed a motion to stay the injunction, and
gave the plaintiff notice of the latter. The motion was argued the
following day, and the plaintiff was given three days to file a
brief, which he did. Thereupon the motion was allowed, and the
injunction order was stayed pending the appeal therefrom. The
plaintiff then filed a motion to vacate the stay order, alleging
that it had been issued without a hearing, and that section 78,
not requiring notice or a hearing on such application for a stay,
denies due process and is therefore invalid.
The Supreme Court, however, held that the plaintiff was in no
position to complain as he had had his day in court and was not
aggrieved in either respect. Nevertheless, the court went on to
say that even if this section were deficient in failing to provide
for notice and a hearing, Rule 31 of the Supreme Court expressly
supplies the omission and may be incorporated therein. Mr.
justice Orr, however, dissented.
J. M. HIADSALL
1 363 Ill. 25, 1 N. E. (2d) 220 (1936).
2 The sentence in this section which formed the hub of the controversy is,

"The force and effect of such interlocutory order or decree and the proceedings in the court below shall not be stayed during the pendency of such
appeal, except upon order of the Appellate Court or a judge thereof in
vacation." The latter clause was claimed to permit a stay order without
notice or hearing.

